WASHINGTON, D.C. -

Results from a nearly yearlong federal study revealed Tuesday determined Toyota vehicles did not contain electronic flaws that could create unintended acceleration, delighting automaker officials but still leaving some industry analysts skeptical.

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The study orchestrated by the U.S. Department of Transportation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and NASA found no electronic flaws in Toyota vehicles capable of producing the large throttle openings required to create dangerous high-speed unintended acceleration incidents.

Federal officials discovered the two mechanical safety defects identified by NHTSA more than a year ago — “sticking” accelerator pedals and a design flaw that enabled accelerator pedals to become trapped by floor mats — remain the only known causes for these kinds of unsafe unintended acceleration incidents.

As a result of the incidents, Toyota recalled nearly 8 million vehicles in the United States for these two defects.

U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood declared, “We enlisted the best and brightest engineers to study Toyota’s electronics systems, and the verdict is in. There is no electronic-based cause for unintended high-speed acceleration in Toyotas.”

Toyota Reacts Positively to Study Findings

Steve St. Angelo, Toyota’s chief quality officer for North America, incorporated several elements regarding safety and reliability of the manufacturer’s vehicles into his response to this study.

“Toyota welcomes the findings of NASA and NHTSA regarding our Electronic Throttle Control System with intelligence (ETCS-i) and we appreciate the thoroughness of their review,” St. Angelo began.

“We believe this rigorous scientific analysis by some of America’s foremost engineers should further reinforce confidence in the safety of Toyota and Lexus vehicles,” he continued. “We hope this important study will help put to rest unsupported speculation about Toyota’s ETCS-i, which is well-designed and well-tested to ensure that a real world, un-commanded acceleration of the vehicle cannot occur.

“We will continue to develop and equip Toyota and Lexus vehicles with industry-leading safety technologies, including many based on breakthroughs in sophisticated electronics systems,” St. Angelo went on to say. “We will also continue to cooperate fully with NHTSA and respected outside experts in order to help ensure that our customers have the utmost confidence in the safety and reliability of our vehicles. 

“Everyone at Toyota — all 30,000 of our team members in the United States and the many thousands of Americans at our dealers and suppliers across the country — is focused on listening to our customers and constantly improving our products and service,” he added.

To back up St. Angelo’s litany of claims, the company also noted a host of facts about Toyota vehicles with ETCS-i:

—Electronic throttle control systems have long been standard across the automobile industry, and they provide great benefits to consumers.

—Toyota’s ETCS-i has performed reliably in more than 40 million cars and trucks sold around the world, including more than 16 million in the United States.

—This system has also made possible significant safety advances such as vehicle stability control and traction control, which are among the five sophisticated accident avoidance technologies in Toyota’s Star Safety System.

—These enhancements, along with Toyota’s Smart Stop Technology braking system, are now standard on all the new vehicles Toyota manufactures for the North American market.

Industry Reaction Mixed

While the federal study didn’t pinpoint an electronic flaw as the cause of Toyota’s recalls, a pair of industry analysts believes the automaker has plenty of work left to do to complete a turnaround.

“The issue is not going to go away just because they didn’t find anything,” insisted Jeremy Anwyl, the chief executive officer of Edmunds.com.

“The fact that they couldn’t replicate unintended acceleration doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist, whatever the cause,” Anwyl continued.

“It’s very hard to prove a negative. It was a good move to bring NASA in for credibility but we haven’t moved the ball forward. This will be an issue that will continue to fester,” he went on to say.

James Bell, executive market analyst for Kelley Blue Book’s Kbb.com, thought no matter what the study showed, the entire episode has left Toyota in a negative situation.

“Many on both sides of the issue hope the report will resolve the mysterious issue once and for all,” Bell surmised.

“Regardless of the outcome, we have found through Kelley Blue Book Market Intelligence that a small group of today’s consumers have truly ‘moved on’ and are not likely to return to the brand even if the report’s results are favorable for Toyota,” he continued.

“It is interesting to note that many of the unintended acceleration events in question occurred in and around the time when this story was most acutely in the minds of the media and consumers,” Bell added. “If there was truly something wrong with the throttle systems in its millions of models worldwide, would it have been an epidemic that would have been impossible to deny?”

Federal Officials Share Toyota Study Methodology

The Department of Transportation and NHTSA recounted that it launched the study last spring at the request of Congress, and enlisted NASA engineers with expertise in areas such as computer controlled electronic systems, electromagnetic interference and software integrity to conduct new research into whether electronic systems or electromagnetic interference played a role in incidents of unintended acceleration in several Toyota models.

In conducting their report, NASA engineers explained they evaluated the electronic circuitry in Toyota vehicles and analyzed more than 280,000 lines of software code for any potential flaws that could initiate an unintended acceleration incident.

At the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland, NASA hardware and systems engineers said they rigorously examined and tested mechanical components of Toyota vehicles that could result in an unwanted throttle opening.

At a special facility in Michigan, NHTSA and NASA engineers pointed out they bombarded vehicles with electromagnetic radiation to study whether such radiation could cause malfunctions resulting in unintended acceleration.

Furthermore, NHTSA engineers and researchers noted they also tested Toyota vehicles at NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Test Center in East Liberty, Ohio, to determine whether there were any additional mechanical causes for unintended acceleration and whether any of the test scenarios developed during the NHTSA-NASA investigation could actually occur in real-world conditions.

“NASA found no evidence that a malfunction in electronics caused large unintended accelerations,” stated Michael Kirsch, principal engineer at the NASA Engineering and Safety Center.

While NASA and NHTSA have identified no electronic cause of dangerous unintended acceleration incidents in Toyota vehicles or any new mechanical causes beyond sticking pedals and accelerator pedal entrapment, NHTSA officials mentioned they are considering taking several new actions as the result of study findings.

NHTSA said these possible actions include:

—Propose rules by the end of 2011 to require brake override systems, to standardize operation of keyless ignition systems and to require the installation of event data recorders in all passenger vehicles.

—Begin broad research on the reliability and security of electronic control systems.

—Research the placement and design of accelerator and brake pedals, as well as driver usage of pedals, to determine whether design and placement can be improved to reduce pedal misapplication.

“While today marks the end of our study with NASA, our work to protect millions of American drivers continues,” noted NHTSA administrator David Strickland.

“The record number of voluntary recalls initiated by automakers last year is also very good news, and shows that we can work cooperatively with industry to protect consumers,” Strickland continued.

Based on objective event data recorder readings and crash investigations conducted as part of NHTSA’s report, the administration also mentioned that it’s researching whether better placement and design of accelerator and brake pedals can reduce pedal misapplication, which occurs in vehicles across the industry.

NHTSA said its forthcoming rulemaking to require brake override systems in all passenger vehicles will further help ensure that braking can take precedence over the accelerator pedal in emergency situations.

Recap of Toyota Recall Events

As the industry widely knows, Toyota recalled nearly 8 million vehicles in the United States for two mechanical safety defects that can cause unintended acceleration: ‘sticking’ accelerator pedals and a design flaw that can cause accelerator pedals to become trapped by floor mats.

When NHTSA first identified the two defects more than a year ago, the agency recounted that it pushed Toyota to conduct recalls quickly. Toyota later paid nearly $33 million in civil penalties as the result of investigations into whether the company notified NHTSA in a timely manner about these defects.

During Congressional hearings on the Toyota recalls last February, officials recollected that members of Congress asked NHTSA to study whether electronic or software problems in Toyota vehicles could be to blame for unintended acceleration. At Congress’ request, NHTSA simultaneously launched two studies: one designed to evaluate possible electronic causes for unintended acceleration in Toyota models and a broader effort to look at unintended acceleration across the automotive industry.

Then in March, NHTSA said it enlisted top NASA engineers and experts in areas such as electromagnetic compatibility to study whether electronic flaws can cause unintended acceleration.

Federal officials also offered a specific time line of major events:

—March 29, 2007: NHTSA opens a preliminary investigation into pedal entrapment on MY’07 Lexus ES350 models based on five consumer complaints alleging three crashes and seven injuries. The all weather floor mat is identified as the possible cause of these incidents. 

—July 26, 2007: A fatal crash occurs in San Jose, Calif., involving a 2007 Camry in which the driver suffers serious injuries and the driver of the struck vehicle is killed. The incident also appears to have been caused by a pedal trapped by an all weather floor mat.

—Sept. 13, 2007: After determining the fatal San Jose crash was caused by floor mat entrapment, NHTSA tells Toyota a recall is necessary.

—Sept. 26, 2007: Toyota recalls 55,000 floor mats in 2007 and 2008 Camrys and Lexus ES350s.

— Aug. 28, 2009: A fatal crash occurs in Santee, Calif., involving a loaner 2009 Lexus ES350. The vehicle is found to have an all weather floor mat from another Lexus vehicle. Investigators find that the vehicle’s previous driver had reported an entrapment incident to the dealership.

—Sept. 25, 2009: NHTSA meets with Toyota and tells the company that the floor mat recall is insufficient and the agency expects a recall for the defect in pedal design. Three days later, Toyota tells NHTSA the company will recall the gas pedals.

—Oct. 5, 2009: Toyota recalls 3.8 million vehicles for pedal entrapment by floor mat and sends an interim letter to consumers telling them to remove floor mats. The defect remedy involves gas pedal reconfiguration, floor pan/carpeting revisions, and "brake pedal override" software for vehicles with keyless ignition.

—Dec. 15, 2009: NHTSA officials meet with Toyota executives in Japan to explain NHTSA’s defect recall process and underscore Toyota’s obligations under U.S. law to find and report defects promptly. Toyota commits to making improvements.

—Jan. 16, 2010: Toyota informs NHTSA that certain CTS-brand pedals may have a dangerous “sticking” defect. NHTSA calls an in-person meeting on Jan. 19.

—Jan. 19, 2010: At the meeting, Toyota provides field reports on sticky pedal incidents, and NHTSA tells Toyota the agency expects prompt action. Toyota informs NHTSA several hours later that the company will issue a recall.

—Jan. 21, 2010: Toyota recalls 2.3 million vehicles for the sticky pedal defect.

—Jan. 27, 2010: At NHTSA’s urging, Toyota expands its pedal entrapment recall to cover an additional 1.1 million vehicles.

—Feb. 16, 2010: NHTSA launches an official probe into the timeliness and scope of the pedal entrapment and sticky pedal Toyota recalls.

—March 30, 2010: At the request of Congress, the U.S. DOT announces two studies into unintended acceleration. One looks at possible electronics causes for unintended acceleration in Toyotas; the other examines unintended acceleration and the safety of vehicle electronics across the automotive industry.

—April 5, 2010: NHTSA demands the maximum, $16.375 million civil penalty on Toyota for its failure to notify the agency of the sticky pedal defect for more than four months after discovering it. Auto manufacturers are legally obligated to notify NHTSA within five business days of determining that a safety defect exists. Toyota pays the full fine on April 19.

—Dec. 20, 2010: Toyota agrees to pay the maximum $16.375 million civil penalty as the result of another NHTSA investigation into whether their recall of 5.5 million vehicles for pedal entrapment was conducted in a timely manner.